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Second-Order False Beliefs and Recursive Complements in
Children with ASD
 





Much is known about how Theory of Mind (ToM) is acquired and the factors 
which facilitate its development; it is now well established that children’s 
understanding of other minds depends on a number of language skills and 
working memory development. But most previous research has focused on first-
order (FO) false belief (FB) understanding, using different versions of FO 
unexpected contents (Smarties style) and transfer (Sally-Anne style) tasks. 
Second-order (SO) false belief understanding, however, is far less studied and 
relatively little is known about its development (Miller, 2012), particularly when 
it comes to children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).  
While there is agreement that second-order reasoning is more complex than 
first-order reasoning – there is one new mental state in the reasoning chain, and 
it is a belief about another agent’s belief - the cognitive status of the shift from 
first- to second-order FB understanding remains unclear. Echoing the divide 
between the Vygotskian and Piagetian traditions, two main theoretical positions 
have been proposed: conceptual change and complexity-only (Miller, 2012). 
According to the conceptual change position, gaining SO FB competency is a 
qualitative transformation of the underlying thought system, one requiring 
acquisition of new conceptual resources. According to the complexity-only 
position, on the other hand, SO FB development does not involve significant 
conceptual change: rather, once FO FB conceptual abilities have been acquired, 
performance on SO FB tests is related to higher information processing skills. 
Some autism research findings seem to support this position (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 1994).    
Ever since the seminal study of Baron-Cohen and his colleagues in 1985, the 
Theory of Mind deficit account has been an influential explanation of the 
difficulties that children with ASD experience, namely delayed or different 
development of the ability to represent other minds (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Even 
though some studies report findings that do not support the ToM deficit account 
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(Bowler et. al., 2005), and other significant theoretical accounts have been put 
forward (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007), the Theory of Mind deficit account 
remains influential, and is applied in both theoretical and clinical settings. For 
example, a recent study with Danish-speaking children, comparing Theory of 
Mind, Executive Function and Local Bias accounts, reports that ToM deficits 
differentiate children with ASD from those with typical development at baseline 
and across time (Cantio, 2016). Thus, a deeper understanding of ToM is relevant 
to understanding a key theoretical approach to ASD; and exploring the cognitive 
factors that are important for SO FB development in ASD may turn out to be 
clinically and educationally valuable.  
Both language and working memory seem of special relevance for the ASD 
population. On the one hand, language has been viewed as providing 
compensatory techniques for developing understanding of other minds - some 
studies say that children with ASD use language to ‘‘hack out’’ the solutions to 
FB tasks (Lind & Bowler, 2009), and other studies say that they use language as 
a ‘‘scaffolding’’ in developing the capacity to understand mental states (Tager-
Flusberg & Joseph, 2005).  A recent training study with Danish-speaking children 
with ASD has confirmed that language can support FO false belief understanding 
(Boeg Thomsen, 2016). On the other hand, several studies have reported that 
executive functions - including working memory - correlate with and predict FO 
FB in children with ASD (Boeg Thomsen 2016; Pellicano, 2007).  
FB reasoning is involved in everyday communicational and social situations, 
often combined with pragmatic and affective elements. In the FO case, Wellman 
& Liu’s (2004) investigation indicated a clear ascending order of difficulty in 
understanding desires, beliefs, perceptual access to knowledge, false beliefs and 
hidden emotions for typically developing children. Using the same methodology, 
Peterson, Wellman & Liu’s (2005) study with children with ASD has illustrated 
that the same order of difficulty applies for desires, diverse beliefs and access to 
knowledge, but that false beliefs are harder than hidden emotions; indeed, they 
suggest that individuals with ASD may have a distinctive difficulty with the type 
of mental state understanding that is needed for false belief tasks. All this suggests 
that it may be valuable to move beyond the FO case and investigate SO FB tasks 




In our study we investigated possible developmental links between second-
order false belief understanding, linguistic recursion and working memory, and 
our participants were Danish-speaking children with ASD. By linguistic 
recursion, we mean “the embedding of a constituent inside a constituent of the 
same category” (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005). This is relevant to FB tasks because 
it is linguistic recursion that enables us to build sentences to talk about beliefs 
about beliefs (Anne believes that Sally believes that the ball is in the basket) and 
indeed, about beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, and so on. As mentioned above, 




sentential complements might provide a “scaffolding” for ToM development in 
children with ASD; one of our goals was to investigate this idea in a SO FB 
setting, applied to recursive sentential complements. Moreover, de Villiers, 
Hobbs, & Hollebrandse (2014) have hypothesized that mastery of recursive 
sentential complements is necessary for recursive false belief reasoning. Our own 
previous logical analysis of SO FB tasks highlighted the importance of recursion: 
it shows that SO reasoning can be viewed as the recursive embedding of first-
order reasoning about different agents - but as recursive logics of belief are more 
complex than those required to analyze FO FB tasks, processing issues are also 
relevant and should be experimentally investigated (Braüner, Blackburn, & 
Polyanskaya, 2016b). This brings us to the other cognitive competency that we 
are investigating: working memory. In addition to the earlier mentioned findings 
regarding working memory’s predictive role for FO FB (both for children with 
ASD and typically developing), a recent study has identified working memory as 
a significant predictor of SO FB competencies in typically developing population 
(Arslan, Hohenberger, & Verbrugge, 2017). 
 
3. Methods and materials 
3.1. Subjects 
 
There were 62 children in our sample. Their age range was 6-16 years old, 
with four most frequent age groups: 10 year-olds (19%), 11-year-olds (16%), 12-
year-olds (11%) and 13-year-olds (14.5%). Most participants were recruited from 
schools for children with special educational needs in the Sjælland region of 
Denmark, though five children from the sample were recruited via direct contact 
with parents. The children had to satisfy the following criteria in order to be 
initially included: parental consent had to be obtained, they had to be diagnosed 
with ASD (based on a formal evaluation by a specialist), they had to be aged 6-
16 and they could have no medical treatment affecting cognitive performance. 
Moreover, they had to have Danish as their native language, be monolingual, have 
no learning difficulties or language delays at time of recruitment, and (based on 
a teacher’s assessment) had to have the emotional readiness to undergo a testing 




In the first step, children were given standard tasks from verbal 
comprehension and working memory indices (WISC-IV) as well as general 
grammar comprehension (TROG-2). The results of these tests served as 
quantitative inclusion criteria: we only selected children with working memory 
and language skills within the age norms specified by these tests (the standard 
score for VC and WM had to be at least 80 for a child to be included to the study). 
Children who met all the above-mentioned criteria were included in the 
correlation study, and in the next step they were given SO FB tasks and recursive 




Scale (SRS) questionnaire, a validated quantitative measure of autistic traits 
developed by Constantino et. al. (2003) and suitable for use in research studies of 
ASD. The testing sessions were carried out in schools or in private homes, in an 
environment familiar to children. All children were tested individually over two 
or three sessions, which usually lasted between 45 and 60 minutes each, 
depending on the child.  
 
4. Second-order false-belief tasks 
 
We made use of all four different patterns of SO FB reasoning that we are 
aware of (Braüner, Blackburn, & Polyanskaya, 2016a). The four SO FB tasks 
were randomized in order of presentation across children. The four tests are 
Danish translations of standard SO FB stories: Ice cream (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985), Puppy (Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994), SO Sally Anne 
(Baron-Cohen et. al., 1999), and Bake Sale (Hollebrandse, Van Hout, Hendriks, 
2014). Analysis of the logical structure of the four tasks shows that they are all 
distinct (Braüner, Blackburn, & Polyanskaya, 2016a).  
In all four tasks, obtaining the correct answers requires the child to 
understand/represent what one protagonist of the story believes that another 
protagonist believes, where the first protagonist’s belief is false. Two of the 
stories (Ice-Cream and Puppy) were taken from the Danish version of the 
validated Dutch ToM Storybook Frank (Blijd-Hoogewys et. al., 2008), translated 
and validated for Danish by Clemmensen et. al. (2016). Here is the ice-cream 
story: Frederik, Katrine and the ice-cream man are in the park. Katrine goes 
home to get money to buy ice-cream. While she is gone, the ice-cream man tells 
Frederik that he is going over to the market square to sell ice-cream there. As he 
drives over to the market square, Katrine happens to see him and he tells her the 
same thing. But Frederik does not know this. Later on Frederik goes to Katrine’s 
house and her mother tells him that Katrine has gone out to buy ice-cream. So 
Frederik runs off to look for Katrine. The child participants are asked ‘‘Where 
does Frederik think Katrine has gone?’’ (judgement question) and they are asked 
to justify their answer. 
None of the test questions in any of the four stories we used contained any 
recursive sentential complements. That is, participants did not need to have 
mastered this form of linguistic recursion to understand the questions. In all the 
stories children were asked memory or first-order false belief questions to ensure 
that they understood the scenarios. In total, children were asked 10 SO FB 
questions (6 judgement and 4 justification) and 11 control questions (4 first-order 
and 7 memory). The score range for judgement answers was 0-6 (two of the tests 
have 2 judgement questions) while for justifications it was 0-12, yielding our 
composite score range of 0-18. A justification score of 0 was given for incorrect 
explanation. A justification score of 1 was given for correct reasoning without 
any references to mental states (Because that is what the ice-cream man told him), 




he does not know that she saw the ice-cream man), and 3 was given for using two 
or more mental verbs (Because he thinks that she does not know that the ice-
cream man left the park). Participants were only credited with points for SO FB 
questions if they had passed the control questions.   
 
5. Recursive embedding tool (RET) 
 
We found no validated test in Danish to measure the ability to comprehend 
and/or produce recursive embeddings, so we developed one for the purposes of 
this study and validated it based on responses from 240 typically developing 
Danish-speaking children and 15 adults. RET initially consisted of two 
subsections, possessive nouns and sentential complements, but since there was a 
clear ceiling effect for the possessive nouns subsection, we only used the 
sentential complements subsection in the present study. The subsection on 
sentential complements consists of five items. The items for this subsection were 
shaped as short stories concluded by questions; participants received 1 point for 
a correct answer and 0 for a wrong one. The stories and accompanying images 
are inspired by the hypothesis that in order to recognize genuine sentential 
complement recursion, children need truth-value contrasts between clauses (De 
Villiers, Hobbs, & Hollebrandse, 2014), thus the stories include a statement that 
does not correspond to the story-world’s reality to prompt the recursive reading. 
Such considerations lie behind the following RET example (note the truth-value 










6. Results  
 
In our first analysis, we inspected the interrelationships among composite 
second-order false belief scores, recursive complements, general grammar 
comprehension, working memory, age in years and autistic severity symptoms 
(SRS). Not all variables were normally distributed, which is why we used a 
nonparametric measure of the strength and direction of association, namely 
Kendall's tau-b (τb). Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients and strength 
among study variables: 
 
Table 1 (** means significant at the 0.01 level) 
 SOFB 1 2 3 4 
RET (1) .28**     
TROG (2) .27** .18    
WM (3) .36** .19 .30**   
Age (4) .36** .09 .32** .40**  
SRS -.16 -.03 -.002 .000 -.18 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, SO FB scores correlated significantly and 
positively with all variables except SRS, where – as expected – there was a 
negative correlation, but it was not significant. 
In our second analysis, we used hierarchical regression analysis to test 
whether mastery of linguistic recursion (RET) predicted SOFB understanding, 
when controlled for age, working memory (WM) and grammar comprehension. 
The SOFB score was the dependent variable and age, working memory and 
TROG were entered first, followed by RET scores. All relevant statistical 
assumptions were checked. With age, WM and TROG, the model explained 
29.4% of the variance in SOFB understanding, F(3,54)=7.50, p<.001. With RET 
scores, the model explained an additional 5.6% of the variance, F(4,53)=7.15, 
p<.001. Regression coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the full model 
can be found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Variable B SE t p 
Age .50 .24 2.05 .046 
WM .22 .13 1.74 .088 
TROG .21 .35 .58 .561 





As Table 2 shows, as well as recursive complements mastery (p<.05), age 
was also a significant predictor (p<.05), but working memory was only 
marginally significant (p=.088), and grammar comprehension was not significant 
at all.   
In our third analysis, we divided up the total working memory score used in 
the previous analysis into simple and complex memory scores. The difference is 
that simple memory tasks tap what is usually referred to as short-term memory, 
while complex memory tasks involve the ability to manipulate information kept 
in short-term memory. More precisely, in order to investigate the contribution of 
simple and/or complex memory scores, we performed a multiple regression like 
the full model above, but with the total working memory divided up into simple 
and complex memory scores. We excluded grammar comprehension as this 
variable was not significant in the previous model (our second analysis). The 
relevant statistical assumptions were checked, and two values had to be filtered 
from the analysis because of the high leverage. The multiple regression model 
statistically significantly predicted SOFB scores, F(4,54)=7.16, p<.001, with 
34.6% of the variance explained. Regression coefficients, standard errors and p-
values for the resulting model can be found in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Variable B SE t P 
Age .56 .23 2.44 .018 
Simple WM -.18 .43 -.43 .668 
Complex WM .37 .18 2.07 .043 
RET .66 .30 2.19 .033 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, three variables were significant (p<.05), namely 
age, complex working memory scores, and recursive complements, however 
simple working memory scores were not. Thus, splitting the marginally 
significant variable total WM indicated the predictive role of complex WM tasks, 
but not of simple WM tasks.  
Our last analysis was inspired by visual inspection of distribution of SOFB 
scores. As can be seen in Figure 1, there are two clusters of composite scores (at 
around 5 and 13 points) which suggests that total SOFB can be investigated on 
two levels when analyzing impact of the independent variables: lower SOFB 
mean and higher SOFB mean. We ran cluster analysis (an explorative analysis 
that tries to identify structures within the data) on the composite SOFB score, 
which confirmed that the data could meaningfully be split into two clusters: one 
with mean SOFB of 5.30 (SD=2.15, range 1-9) the other with mean SOFB of 
12.76 (SD=1.92, range 10-17). Both clusters consisted of almost equal numbers 




Shapiro-Wilk test. One-way ANOVA showed that the means were statistically 




















As we did in our second analysis, we then conducted hierarchical regression 
on each cluster to test whether RET, the independent variable we are most 
interested in, could be regarded as predictor for high as well as low SOFB 
performance.  Age and working memory were the independent variables we 
controlled for, but grammar comprehension was not included this time because 
of the small sample size. The relevant statistical assumptions were checked, and 
two values had to be filtered from each cluster in the analysis because of the high 
leverage. Intriguingly, the results for the cluster with mean 5.35 (n=31) and for 
the cluster with mean 12.70 (n=27) were not the same. 
In the lower SOFB mean case, the model with age and WM accounted for 
34% of the variance in SOFB understanding, F(2,27)=6.94, p<.005. By adding 
RET scores, the model accounted for an additional 13.9% of the variance, 
F(3,26)=7.95, p<.005, and the change was significant. Regression coefficients, 
standard errors and p-values for the full model can be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Variable B SE t P 
Age .55 .16 3.55 .001 
Total WM -.04 .11 -.38 .704 





As can be seen in Table 4, age and RET were significant predictors of SOFB 
in the cluster with lower SOFB mean. In the higher SOFB mean case, on the other 
hand, the model with age and WM accounted for 29.3% of the variance in SOFB 
understanding, F(2,24)=4.98, p<.05. Furthermore, adding RET scores did not add 
any significant change to the model. Regression coefficients, standard errors and 
p-values for the full model can be found in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Variable B SE t P 
Age -.28 .17 -1.60 .124 
Total WM .26 .09 2.84 .009 
RET -.05 .28 -.17 .864 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, RET and age were not significant predictors, 
and only working memory was significant for the cluster with higher SOFB mean. 
The results clearly demonstrate that different levels of mastery in SOFB reasoning 




Our findings indicated that mastery of recursive complements was a strong, 
significant predictor of second-order false belief understanding, even after 
accounting for age, general grammar comprehension, and working memory. 
Furthermore, our results highlighted the importance of the complex memory 
tasks, that is, the tasks that require ability to both keep information in memory 
and manipulate it in a given short period of time.   
Additionally, our results clearly demonstrate that different levels of mastery 
in SOFB reasoning are predicted by different independent variables. When we 
switch from the lower SOFB mean cluster (Table 4) to the higher SOFB mean 
cluster (Table 5), the significant predictors switch from the age and RET variables 
to the working memory variable.  Thus, it seems that when children have not (yet) 
developed SOFB mastery, being able to handle recursive complements in 
language may scaffold the required reasoning, but it is working memory that 
scaffolds it once children have become better at it. 
These results raise many further questions. What does RET scaffold exactly 
in SOFB reasoning (or in what way) – ability to judge false beliefs or ability to 
justify judgement/ability to explain reasoning? Would results regarding RET’s 
being a predictor be different for typically developing children? And are there 
differences here among the four logically distinct SO FB tasks? But rather than 
attempt to answer such questions here, we will briefly comment on another aspect 
of our work, namely its training component.  
640
 
As we mentioned earlier, our initial inclusion criteria included a teacher's 
positive assessment of emotional readiness to undergo a testing situation and a 
training program, as we wanted not only to investigate whether there was a 
correlation between SO FB mastery and recursive sentential complementation, 
but also to provide experimental evidence that mastery of syntactic recursion 
plays a causal role in the development of SO FB understanding.  
Our training used materials similar in style to the RET testing material, and 
aimed to train participants to grasp the following four principles: 
 
1. That several linguistic constituents of the same type may be combined together. 
 
2. That these constituents may be embedded one inside another. 
 
3. That changing the order of embedding changes the meaning. 
 
4. That the number of embedded constituents is potentially unlimited. 
   
For a more details on the design of the training program see (Polyanskaya, 
Blackburn, & Braüner, 2017). Here we'll merely remark that we divided 
participants into three groups: the control (interaction only) group, the WM group 
(who received working memory training via three games on a PC) and those who 
received the RET-style training. Our results showed the effectiveness of our 
recursive embedding training and we are currently preparing a paper on this topic. 
Irina Polyanskaya's forthcoming (late 2018) PhD thesis contains chapters on both the 
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